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Abstract:

This paper examines the relationship between exchange-rate and monetary policies in transition
economies (TEs) bent on entering the European Union (EU) and eventually acceding to the EU's
monetary union. After detailing the present exchange-rate systems and monetary regimes in the
central European TEs, currently practiced targets of monetary policy are reviewed and some
proposed policy changes in response to the requirements of monetary union are discussed.
Thereafter the question whether the candidates are likely to have to resort to a final currency
devaluation no more than two years prior to acceding to monetary union is examined. This is
followed, by way of conclusion, with some further suggestions for desirable adjustments in
short- and long-term monetary policy.
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Introduction
The inception of monetary union among the majority of members of the European Union (EU)
on 1 January 1999 will exert a strong impact on the design of the ongoing economic reforms in
the five transition economies (TEs) - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia that are currently negotiating for entry into the EU. These candidates for EU accession have
opened their economies to a large degree and in the process engaged in fostering active trade and
capital transactions with EU members. They will therefore have to adjust their exchange-rate and
monetary policies in response to the introduction of the euro and monetary union. Not only that,
at some point in the future, after their accession to the EU, they will have to align their monetary
policies with exchange-rate obligations and prepare for accession to the monetary union.
This paper suggests a set of precepts for guiding future adjustments in macroeconomic policies
in the above-cited TE candidates for EU entry. Several general recommendations can be
suggested: (i) the TEs need to elaborate long-term plans for full accession to the EU; (ii) the preaccession strategy of these countries needs to focus on coordinating the national legal systems
with the EU's acquis communautaire (henceforth acquis) and on completing the structural
reforms and the institutional changes agreed upon within the frame-work of accession
negotiations; (iii) their post-accession strategies are likely to focus on preparations for entry into
the monetary union; (iv) these countries are well-advised not to rush to an early, premature
accession to the monetary union as their underlying rate of inflation is still too high and their
financial markets and institutions unprepared for early accession (Fink, Haiss, Orlowski, and
Salvatore, 1998); and (v) before entering monetary union, these countries need to complete
structural and institutional reforms leading to an efficient banking system and to the creation of
modern financial markets.

Monetary and fiscal convergence in the candidate countries consistent with the nominal
convergence criteria specified in the Maastricht Treaty is not a precondition for EU accession.
However, the entrants will be held to rigid requirements of low inflation and a minimum ratio of
the consolidated fiscal budget deficit to gross domestic product (GDP), certainly once they
approach eventual accession to monetary union by joining the new Exchange Rate Mechanism or
ERM II. Even at an early stage, however, these macroeconomic convergence benchmarks will
serve as helpful policy guidelines in order to generate the degree of price and income stability
that is essential for securing eventual entry into the EU. This analysis assumes that the desirable
disinflation and the required institutional and structural tasks of transformation can be better
accomplished if central banks in TEs apply money-based monetary policies and a more flexible
exchange-rate regime. For those to bear fruit, the monetary authorities need to enhance the
credibility and consistency of their policies. Therefore, it is not advisable for them to pursue a
discretionary monetary policy based on interest-rate targeting. Rather, direct targeting of
inflation offers an attractive alternative that may improve the credibility and transparency of
monetary policies in the TEs.
Preparations for accession to monetary union will require strict adherence to policies that can
lead to fulfilling the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria. The final stages of approaching
entry into the monetary union will require a change in monetary policy from a money-based one
into one based on maintaining the exchange rate. This monetary-policy change is called in this
study a "return-to-peg strategy." A fixed exchange-rate system is familiar to these TEs since their
heterodox programs of economic transformation in the early 1990s were mostly based on a
pegged currency. These countries have since then gradually departed or "exited" from fixed
exchange rates in favor of pursuing more autonomous monetary policies by applying more
flexible exchange rates (Desai, 1998; Orlowski, 1997a; Sachs, 1996). The strategy of returning to
the currency peg will be gradually shifting responsibility for disinflation to fiscal policy since
monetary flexibility will be curbed. It is therefore essential for TE governments to adhere to
strict fiscal convergence. Since inflation attributable to backward-looking expectations is still
firmly rooted in these economies, it seems advisable for the candidates to follow even a tighter
benchmark than the maximum 3 percent fiscal deficit-to-GDP criterion specified in the
Maastricht Treaty (Orlowski, 1997b). If the required disinflation is not accomplished, an early
application of the currency peg to the euro will lead to a considerable real appreciation of the
TEs' currencies, to chronic current-account deficits, and to an unfavorable risk structure of
capital inflows. The real appreciation of currencies of these countries has already contributed to a
gradually deteriorating "pecking order" of incoming external capital or the faster growth of
portfolio capital over foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (Orlowski and Corrigan, 1997).
Consequently, prolonged balance-of-payments problems may undermine the TEs' further
economic transformation and integration into the EU.
The paper is organized as follows. After an examination of present exchange-rate and monetary
regimes in the five cited TEs, I review their prevailing monetary-policy targets and discuss some
proposed policy changes warranted by entry into the monetary union. Then I deal with the
question of whether the candidates are likely to experience a "last devaluation syndrome"
(Grauwe, 1997); that is, will they be forced to devalue their currencies at least two years prior to
accession to the monetary union? In conclusion I present further suggestions for monetary-policy
adjustments in the short- and long-term.

I. Present exchange-rate systems in central Europe
Both the academic literature on the economics of transition and policy makers of TEs have
strongly emphasized the role of the exchange rate as a policy tool aimed at solving some of the
economic imbalances inherited from central planning, such as the monetary overhang and
corrective inflation, nonexistent policy credibility, depleted savings, and deteriorating currentaccount deficits (Bruno, 1992; Sachs, 1996). To accomplish these tasks, most TEs applied fixed
exchange rates at the beginning of their economic transformation. The currency peg was
primarily aimed at containing corrective inflation stemming from liberalization of previously
fixed or rather inflexible prices for most goods, services, and intermediate materials, causing
deep market imbalances and an excess supply of money.
Price liberalization induced a one-time inflation shock of unpredictable duration and depth. At
the outset of the transformation, the new TE governments were not sure whether the disturbance
would be self-correcting or more persistent. They chose to actively fight corrective inflation
using fixed exchange rates as a tool of policy discipline. The currency peg helped to rebuild
national savings, which had been eroded by the corrective inflation, and to restore credibility of
policy makers and public confidence in economic reforms.
The modern literature on exchange-rate policies within the context of economic stabilization in
emerging market economies generally supports the view that successful stabilization programs
anchored to the exchange rate require a predetermined, early "exit strategy" from fixed exchange
rates. Such an approach was variously pursued, both in time and in intensity of the policy
commitment, by the TEs under consideration here (Orlowski, 1997a).
Among the five candidates for EU accession, Poland departed from the dollar peg in May 1991,
after having held it for 16 months. The government applied first a crawling-peg strategy against a
basket consisting of five currencies (dominated by the dollar) and replaced it later with a
crawling-band regime, whose room for fluctuation was expanded in May 1995. This regime is
still in effect. In May 1998, the dollar's weight stood at 45 percent, the band at 10 percent on
either side of parity, and the monthly rate of crawling devaluation at 0.8 percent compounded
daily.
Czechoslovakia devalued its currency against the dollar in two rounds (in October 1990 and in
January 1991) by 50 percent. As part of the January 1991 comprehensive economic reform, the
authorities applied a fixed exchange rate against a basket of five currencies. After the breakup in
1993, the Czech Republic assumed a fixed exchange rate of the koruna against a basket of two
currencies (the deutschmark and the dollar) with a narrow band (0.5 percent around parity) for
fluctuation. The fixed exchange rate was maintained until the end of February 1996, when the
band was expanded to 7.5 percent around parity. As a result of intense attacks on the koruna and
capital outflows in the second quarter of 1997, the Czech National Bank on 27 May 1997
allowed the currency to float, implying a devaluation of the currency, albeit with a commitment
to switch to a deutschmark peg after reaching a "satisfactory" exchange rate against that
currency. Managed floating continues, however.

In contrast, Slovenia has consistently pursued a managed float since the introduction of the tolar
in October 1991. The currency experienced a considerable nominal depreciation in the second
half of 1995 (9 percent in dollar terms). It has been fairly stable in nominal terms since then. On
the other extreme, Estonia has maintained a currency board at 8 kroons to the deutschmark since
June 1992.
Finally, Hungary did not experience major problems stemming from a significant monetary
overhang and it therefore did not commit to a firm currency peg. Since the beginning of 1990
and until March 1995, it pursued an adjustable peg and since then a crawling peg. The country's
central bank enacted a sharp 15 percent devaluation in January 1991. The forint has been pegged
to a dual-currency basket whose specific composition and weights have changed several times.
The most significant currency adjustment was enacted on 13 March 1995, when the forint was
devalued by 9 percent and the crawling devaluation was introduced at a monthly rate of 1.9
percent. The dual-currency basket consists presently of 70 percent for the deutschmark and 30
percent for the dollar. As of May 1998, the regime provides for a 2.5 percent band around central
parity with a monthly rate of crawling devaluation of 0.8 percent.
The three larger candidates for EU accession (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) have in the
meantime joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). One
of the accession-agreement requirements was for these countries to introduce considerable
currency convertibility on capital account. From the beginning of 1999, these TEs will fully
liberalize portfolio investments by domestic residents abroad and capital transfers from abroad
into their economies, allowing cross-border branching in the banking sector. Estonia has
maintained full current and capital-account convertibility as required by the currency board, after
some initial restrictions. The tolar is fully convertible for current-account transactions, and
foreign investors are permitted to repatriate profits and capital.
In sum, the candidates for EU accession are presently maintaining a variety of exchange regimes,
thus varying monetary-policy regimes. The currency flexibility ranges from the fixity under the
Estonian currency board to the Czech and Slovenian managed floats. Also the reference
currencies, whether a basket or otherwise, vary considerably. If these countries desire to join the
EU's monetary union at some future point in time, their specific plans for adjusting monetary
policies and exchange-rate regimes will need to be centered on the target of reaching currency
stability within narrowing bands of fluctuations in terms of the euro. The analytical literature on
the experience with economic stability in the TEs broadly agrees that fixed exchange rates have
successfully fulfilled the task of reducing corrective inflation, building policy credibility, and
restoring national savings. But their anti-inflationary role ought to be deemphasized at the
present stage of transformation.
More flexible exchange rates are perceived to be a better policy at the present stage of
transformation. They allow TE monetary authorities to cushion real appreciation of their national
currencies and, consequently, to prevent the deterioration of current-account deficits. Perhaps
most importantly, by lowering expectations of a further real appreciation of the national
currencies, flexible exchange rates may improve the risk structure of capital inflows, such as by
favoring FDI over portfolio capital inflows. The advantage of such a course is particularly visible
in the case of the Czech Republic, where the current-account deficit stopped deteriorating and

the risk structure of capital inflows was improved as a result of the introduction of the crawling
band system and, later, the managed float (Orlowski and Corrigan, 1997).
Variant monetary regimes, different degrees of currency convertibility for current-account and
capital-account transactions, and, most importantly, diverse degrees of institutional development
and efficiency of financial markets have given rise to a variety of problems such as real currency
appreciation, current-account deficits, and the inflationary consequences of capital inflows.
Table 1 reflects the present stage of these variables in the three largest candidates for EU
accession.
Table 1 Balance of Payments, Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Stability Indicators for
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Real rate (REER), Jan 1990=100(a)
Nominal depreciation against
dollar (percent)(b)
Reserve inflows (percent of GDP)
Current Account (percent of GDP)
Real GDP growth
Change in CPI
Gross Domestic Investments/GDP
Gross National Savings/GDP

1996

Poland
1996

Hungary
1997
1996

143.6
-16.5

147.7
-22.4

109.4
-18.3

121.3
-23.8

0.1
-1.4
6.1
19.9
20.4
19.4

1.5
-4.3
6.9
14.9
22.9
19.7

-3.3
-3.8
1.3
19.8
25.0
23.2

4.0
-2.2
4.0
18.4
24.9
23.0

Czech Republic
1996
1997
Real rate (REER), Jan 1990=100(a)
Nominal depreciation against
dollar (percent)(b)
Reserve inflows (percent of GDP)
Current Account (percent of GDP)
Real GDP growth
Change in CPI
Gross Domestic Investments/GDP
Gross National Savings/GDP

142.7
-2.7

144.7
-23.1

0.1
-8.6
3.9
7.4
33.0
25.4

-2.3
-6.6
1.0
13.0
30.2
23.9

Notes:
(a) The real effective exchange-rate index based on consumer price deflators (January 1990=
100) as compiled by J.P. Morgan.
(b) Based on year-end exchange rates.
Sources: International financial statistics. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, various
issues; World financial markets. Morgan Guarantee Trust Company, 27 March 1998, p. 52; and
monthly reports of the CNB, NBH, and NBP, various issues.

In all three countries, inflation in 1996 was higher than the nominal depreciation of the currency,
thus contributing to rising real exchange rates. The data for 1996 confirm the point advanced by
Halpern and Wyplosz (1996), as well as by Begg (1996), that with quasi-fixed exchange rates
(crawling pegs and bands) the primary cause of the real currency appreciation in the central
European TEs is high inflation; appreciation will stop only with the completion of the
transformation.
The inflation picture changed in 1997 in that the pace of inflation was lower than the nominal
appreciation, at least in dollar terms. To some extent, this results from the overall appreciation of
the dollar in terms of other key international currencies. Yet, the slowdown of the real
appreciation of TEs' currencies also stems from the expanded flexibility of exchange rates,
primarily in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland. It is worth noting that the real effective
exchange rate (REER) of the forint increased significantly in 1997. It is possible that greater
flexibility of the forint's exchange rate would alleviate this rise.
The strong real appreciation of the zloty along with fast GDP growth and the lagging of national
savings behind gross fixed capital formation in Poland have all contributed to the rising currentaccount deficit. The Czech Republic experienced similar problems even more severely in 19941996, leading to the peak ratio of the current account to GDP of 8.6 percent in 1996. Halting the
koruna's real appreciation by raising exchange rate flexibility successfully reduced this ratio in
1997. Pressures on the current account in Hungary are considerably lower due to the lower GDP
growth rate, the ratio of national savings to investment, and the previous stability of the REER.
However, inflation remains excessive in Hungary and may call for further real appreciation of
the currency in the foreseeable future, thus possibly worsening the current-account deficit.
The above empirical evidence suggests key tasks for exchange-rate policies in the TEs. Their
monetary authorities are encouraged to find ways to slow down the ongoing real appreciation of
their currencies in order to improve the balance of payments. This can be achieved best by
applying flexible exchange rates and money-based monetary policies. At the same time, they
need to pursue rigorous fiscal and monetary discipline in order to reduce inflation more
decisively. As stated by Mishkin (1997), price stability is essential for financial stability of
economic systems. It expands the maturity of debt contracts, thus making it easier for financialand business-sector institutions to borrow long-term capital in domestic currency. At the end, it
helps to reduce fragility of financial systems. More flexible exchange rates also favor the
development of domestic foreign-exchange markets, which are essential for the future integration
of these countries into the EU's financial system. Moreover, flexible rates provide clear signals
about macroeconomic-policy fundamentals. If market exchange rates are not distorted, a sharp
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate normally serves as a warning sign for possible
corrective policies to adjust macroeconomic imbalances.
In sum, the ongoing transformation in TEs could benefit from the introduction of more flexible
exchange rates as an integral component of money-based monetary policies. If these TEs were to
base their monetary policies on the exchange rate as a result of an overhasty entry into the ERM
II and monetary union, at least prior to cutting inflation to a sustainable low level, they risk
generating a further real appreciation of their national currencies and extending severe balanceof-payments problems. Furthermore, it is widely argued in the literature that a high degree of

exchange-rate flexibility, such as a managed float or crawling peg with wide bands, are helpful
for absorbing both demand- and supply-side shocks in the economy (Halpern and Wyplosz,
1996). Assuming that the early phase of monetary union may inflict asymmetric shocks on the
"outs," or the countries remaining outside the euro zone (see Grauwe, 1996; Wypiosz, 1997),
more flexible exchange rates will provide a better cushion against such shocks.
Market-determined exchange rates are advantageous for the development of emerging financial
markets and institutions in TEs because they require the development of complex derivative
instruments for hedging risks. They tend to more accurately reflect current supply and demand
equilibria in foreign-exchange markets and monetary-equilibrium positions with respect to
international currencies. That is to say, just like current exchange rates of TEs reflect equilibrium
positions of domestic currencies in terms of international currencies in foreign-exchange
markets, reaching for the financial-market equiequilibria that reflect interest-parity conditions
and represent sentiments of traders to sell or to buy foreign exchange would only strengthen the
desirability of moving toward more flexible exchange rates.
In contrast, fixed exchange-rate regimes turn off the informational function of currency rates,
thus becoming policy-steering parameters rather than market variables. Currency derivatives are
not needed in this case. Flexible rates are required for monetary systems that focus on stability of
money balances and interest rates. They provide valuable information on foreign-exchange
positions to central banks, leaving interest rates or money balances as intermediate or operational
targets of monetary policy. Under a fixed exchange rate, stable currency rates themselves
become a key operational target of monetary policy. As a result, exchange-rate systems need to
be analyzed in the broader context of choosing among alternative monetary-policy systems that
depend on a proper selection of policy targets. Specifically, a currency peg implies that a stable
exchange rate should be set as an intermediate policy target. It may be accompanied by a predetermined difference between domestic and foreign interest rates as an operating target. A
flexible exchange-rate system is consistent with a growth of money balances or a forecast rate of
inflation chosen as intermediate targets.
II. Monetary-policy targeting: is the euro-peg on the horizon?
With the prospect of eventually joining the EU, the TE candidates have to choose among a
variety of intermediate and operational monetary-policy targets for, as set forth earlier, their
monetary-policy systems vary significantly, complicating the design of a uniform "return-to-peg
strategy" at this juncture. However, the ultimate targets of their monetary policy show greater
similarities (Krzak and Schubert, 1997). Recently published monetary-policy directives of
central banks in all five countries emphasize a long-term commitment to disinflation and to
safeguarding currency stability. However, the Czech and Polish central banks in their directives
state also the goal of supporting "economic policy of the governmental targets." Interest-rate
targeting is based on observed variables, and it is thus a backward-looking policy. The targeting
horizon becomes very short and the policy is frequently reset. While applying discretionary
changes of interest rates as operational targets, central banks still need to apply some
intermediate targets.

The central banks of the five TEs under discussion do not apply uniform targets for monetary
policy. Moreover, there has been considerable inconsistency in their choices of monetary targets.
Until the end of 1997, the Czech National Bank (CNB) claimed to aim at controlling M2
balances as an intermediate target and the one-week Prague Interbank Offer Rate (PRIBOR) as
an operating target (Krzak and Schubert, 1997). Since the beginning of 1998, it has applied coreinflation targeting. The new system allows to integrate intermediate and operating targets by
setting a predetermined level of core inflation with a fairly narrow band of tolerance. The CNB
has applied a 6.0 percent core inflation target with a 0.5 percent band on either side for 1998, and
a 4.5 percent target with a 1.0 percent tolerance band for 2000, which is the date planned by
policy makers for entry into ERM II, however unlikely that may actually be; perhaps the policy
commitment would be to shadow ERM II until entry into the EU, and thus ERM II, becomes
feasible. The new Czech system offers an attractive alternative for monetary policy in TEs. It is a
forward-looking monetary policy with a transparent commitment to disinflation. However, it can
be viewed also as a temporary, more sophisticated tool of gaining policy credibility and
generating price stability. The CNB is applying a managed float for the koruna as an exchangerate policy fully consistent with the monetary regime based on direct inflation targeting. The
system will have to be gradually changed into a currency peg to the euro, at the latest when the
country enters the ERM II.
The National Bank of Hungary (NBH) states as intermediate targets maintaining the exchange
rate within the current 2.5 percent band on either side of parity and M2, and as operational target
the interest-rate differential vis-a-vis European financial markets. These permit the NBH to
monitor short-term capital inflows more effectively. The system indicates a backward-looking,
discretionary policy of the NBH.
The National Bank of Poland (NBP) still claims to aim at controlling broad money and hold the
exchange rate within the broad 10 percent band (without publishing any implicit target zones,
that is, internal narrower bands) as intermediate targets, although the 1998 monetary-policy
directives of the NBP seem to strongly emphasize the latter. The NBP states the need for
controlling the spread between the one-month Warsaw Interbank Offered Rate (WIBOR) and the
Lombard rate as an operational target in the 1998 policy directives, thus introducing the policy
instrument as a targeting device. Moreover, there has been a considerable degree of
inconsistency in the choice of monetary-policy targets in recent years. Specifically, the NBP
followed short-term interest rates as an operational target in the first half of 1996 and, later,
domestic credit expansion when the GDP growth rate accelerated and the current-account deficit
started to deteriorate. In 1997, it formally announced targeting the monetary base and in 1998 it
switched again to targeting interest rates.
The targeting practices of the NBH and NBP indicate that these central banks are pursuing a
discretionary, rather than a rule-based policy. Discretionary reactions to changes in price and
income variables demonstrate the banks' willingness to exercise power over financial markets
and institutions by changing frequently the interest targets, and to do so without preannouncement and by adhering strictly to the targets at all times. Interest-rate targeting is hardly
transparent and predictable for the financial community since it allows for an unannounced
resetting of targets. The financial sector's foresight, in the sense of its ability to forecast market
conditions, becomes more difficult, thus inducing banks to hold excess reserves with the central

bank for precautionary reasons. Moreover, the TEs are likely to experience large fluctuations of
transactions and in broad money balances while being exposed to double-digit inflation in
combination with fast economic growth. Consequently, the velocity of money becomes very
unstable. Targeting interest rates rather than money balances exacerbates the instability of money
velocity. There is always a tradeoff between choosing the targets that a central bank can control
exactly and those that are most closely related to its ultimate goals. The main positive aspect of
interest-rate targeting is a high likelihood of hitting the target most of the time, which helps to
improve monetary-policy accountability.
In order to enhance policy credibility and to pursue disinflation more effectively, TE central
banks would be better off abandoning the current practice of interest-rate targeting and
considering a system of direct inflation targeting (Orlowski, 1998). That would better prepare
them for the monetary convergence and stability of the domestic currency in terms of the euro,
particularly if they plan to lock their exchange rates to the euro either unilaterally, at a later stage
of the pre-accession period, or through formally joining the ERM II upon entry into the EU. An
early application of the euro-peg is advocated by Barysch (1997) who views it as a tool of
facilitating disinflation and reducing excessive volatility of currencies of the present EU
candidates. However, deferring application of the euro-peg until it becomes sustainable is the
option preferred by this author. Relatively flexible exchange rates at the present stage of
transformation are to be preferred until inflation is reduced to a level where it would no longer
exert upward pressure on the real exchange rate of the TEs' currencies. To this observer, it seems
preferable to reduce inflation while maintaining fiscal discipline and applying a monetary policy
directly targeting inflation rather than using a currency peg as a disciplining tool.
Direct inflation targeting is consistent with a higher degree of exchange-rate flexibility. It can
therefore be applied at the present stage of economic transformation in TEs that have already
expanded the flexibility of their exchange rates. Such a new monetary system brings attractive
advantages to TEs. It implies a forward-looking policy in contrast to the backward-looking
character of interest-rate targeting. It further permits monetary authorities to concentrate on the
predetermined path of disinflation, thereby enhancing the commitment of central banks to
monetary discipline and to price stability. The effectiveness of the new system depends strictly
on the width of the effective tolerance bands on which the deviation of actual inflation rates from
those targeted is predicated. Wider bands allow more time for policy-decision lags, while shorter
bands require rather quick policy responses leading to frequent discretionary reactions to
observed disturbances in actual income and price levels. In this respect, the present 0.5 percent
band applied by the CNB may be viewed as too narrow. The bands of permitted currency
fluctuation closely correspond to "inflation tolerance bands," circumscribing the maximum
allowed deviation of actual inflation from the targeted level. Specifically, a short-term increase
in inflation to the upper bound of the tolerance band is normally accompanied by nominal
depreciation of the domestic currency, thus moving toward the lower support level of the
exchange-rate band.
At the future stage of active preparations for accession to the EU's monetary union, central banks
will have gradually to move toward basing their monetary policy on the exchange rate. This will
require a gradual narrowing of inflation tolerance bands and closing exchange rate bands as the
domestic-currency values in euro terms converge to a stable level. But the close connection

between the inflation path and the exchange rate implies that a stable market exchange rate can
be reached only when inflation approaches a low level consistent with the Maastricht benchmark.
The new system of direct inflation targeting may prove to be very effective in reaching such a
low inflation environment within a period of four to five years for Hungary and Poland and by
the year of 2000 for the Czech Republic. Moreover, the system permits the elimination of some
of the questionable elements of current Hungarian and Polish monetary policies, namely, the
crawling devaluation and the frequent changes in policy instruments, mainly reserve-requirement
ratios and central-bank lending rates. The removal of the crawling devaluation is urgent since it
is viewed as a key factor presently contributing in TEs to wage and price indexation (Rosati,
1996). Upon entry to the EPM II, crawling devaluations will have to be discontinued. The system
of direct inflation targeting seems to be effective for meeting the key prerequisites for a
successful entry into the ERM II.
III. Toward monetary union: a "return-to-peg strategy"
TE fiscal and monetary authorities need to encourage changes in exchange-rate regimes and
operating procedures to prepare the ground for a smooth transition toward joining the euro
regime. Generally speaking, it will be beneficial to these countries to enter the ERM II for as
long as they cannot effectively join the monetary union (Bernard, 1997), that is, for at least two
years after they are admitted as EU members. The governments of the three larger TEs have
already expressed intentions to join the ERM II, thereby reaffirming their commitment to full EU
integration and adding credibility to their preparations.
However, the euro-peg should not come too early and entry into the ERM II may well have to be
deferred, although TEs will be encouraged to join the ERM II upon accession to the EU. The
candidates need flexible exchange rates in order to build and protect an autonomous monetary
policy. A premature "return-to-peg" will undercut the potency of monetary policy, shifting the
primary responsibility for disinflation to fiscal policy. The actual entry into the ERM II depends
on the permitted exchange-rate flexibility within the new system, that is the width of the
fluctuations band. The exchange rate band within the ERM II is likely to remain wide for the
foreseeable future: 15 percent around central parity. However, TE central banks are likely to
apply narrower internal bands or implicit target zones as a tool of monetary discipline.
Depending upon the specific policy approach, the moment of entry to the ERM II will have to
correspond to the width of the bands. With a wider band, the entry to the ERM II is more readily
feasible at an earlier stage, as soon as inflation reaches a low, sustainable level. With a narrower
band, however, entry into the ERM II needs to be delayed to the time when inflation can be
effectively managed at a level consistent with the Maastricht benchmark. In any case, it is not
advisable for the TEs to lock their exchange rates to the euro upon its inception in January 1999
and the decision to join the ERM II should be formulated with caution. The TEs need sufficient
time to monitor their currency's exchange rates in euro terms and to reduce the exchange-rate
volatility stemming from high inflation differentials and still-unstable domestic financial
markets.
Several benefits accrue for the TEs from delaying entry into the ERM II. The move is likely to
enhance credibility of the TEs' monetary policies and to improve fiscal and monetary discipline,
since these countries will be expected to adhere to strict macroeconomic convergence criteria. It

will further benefit the credibility and sincerity of the whole integration program since the
candidates will show in this way that they are committed to full integration. There are also
visible benefits for the ongoing transformation process and for the needed modification of
exchange-rate regimes. Entering the ERM II will probably reduce inflation expectations in these
countries. It is, therefore, likely to reduce indexation of wages and prices, which is still
considerable and contributes to the inflation inertia at the present stage of transformation. In
technical terms, the ERM II will prompt monetary authorities in TEs to discontinue crawling
devaluations that are believed to be adding to the automatic indexation of prices and wages
(Orlowski, 1997a; Rosati, 1996). It will also encourage the NBP to change the basket of
reference currencies in preparation for entry into the ERM II, thus lowering the dollar's weight in
favor of placing the overwhelming weight on the euro. Upon entry into the ERM II, the euro will
have to be the exclusive reference currency. This alignment will enhance the integration of
Poland's financial markets into the EU's.
There are also some disadvantages for TEs of joining the ERM II, especially when entry
precedes the satisfactory completion of the appropriate institutional wherewithal for ensuring the
appropriate functioning of financial markets and constructing an efficient system of bank
supervision and monitoring. As argued by Wyplosz (1997), entering the ERM II upon its
inception would add considerable volatility to the TEs' exchange rates in euro terms since it
remains uncertain how stable the new currency will initially be. Central banks may attempt to
reduce this volatility through active sterilization. But the duration of such sterilization cannot be
too long, if only because of the high fiscal costs associated with it. As a result, it seems
preferable to replace sterilization with some degree of currency appreciation whenever
conditions invite sizable capital inflows. It can be further argued that expectations of a nominal
appreciation of the currency tied to the stability of the euro in combination with the ongoing
inflation among the "outs" will accelerate real appreciation of their currencies.
The overall benefits of joining the ERM II seem to outweigh the expected disadvantages more
and more as the TEs' policy makers succeed in stabilizing prices and exchange rates and as the
euro gains stability in world financial markets. It would therefore seem advisable that the
candidates join the ERM II at some future point, after they become EU members and once they
can sustain monetary stability. This timing does not relieve the TEs' monetary authorities from
preparing soonest a comprehensive, long-term strategy of eventually joining monetary union.
Having such a strategy in place already during the early stages of accession negotiations would
be an asset to TE negotiators.
TE negotiators need to address several important issues regarding exchange-rate policies. One is
the scope of application of the "safeguard clause" by the European Central Bank (ECB). The
clause permits the ECB to suspend intervention and financing in the ERM II framework if these
were to impinge on the objective of price stability. Another issue for the negotiators to ponder is
the need to work out rules for monitoring exchange rates to assure full transparency and
compliance between the EU and ECB preferences, on the one hand, and the TEs' exchange rate
and disinflation policies, on the other.
A broad and critical problem for the negotiators is to define the precise nature and procedures of
the bilateral pegging system within the ERM II framework. This system is based on bilateral

currency arrangements between the "outs" and the ECB, which makes it different in that it is
asymmetric from the expiring ERM I, which is symmetric. In the new ERM, there will be a large
center in the form of the euro zone and several countries remaining outside the monetary union.
As a result, currencies of the "outs" will be linked through bilateral, rather than multilateral,
arrangements with the euro; hence the asymmetry within the system. The new system is
frequently labeled a "hubs-and-spokes" currency system (Gros, 1996).
The bilateral rates will be fixed in a confidential joint manner involving the governors of central
banks of the "outs," the ECB, and the European Commission. The present band of permitted
currency fluctuations of plus-minus 15 percent is likely to be sustained in order to sanction a
sufficiently large room for exchange-rate flexibility of the "outs." However, narrower official
bands or unpublished internal bands are possible, but such solutions will be based on the
"convergence situation" of the individual country. As the "outs" successfully pursue the path to
monetary union, narrowing bands around the euro-peg can be applied if only to demonstrate the
TE's ability to converge smoothly to the common currency system and to reduce fluctuations of
market exchange rates. The gradual narrowing of the official band has been advocated by Klein
(1997). A similar effect can be achieved also by gradually narrowing the unpublished inner
bands, which would also be consistent with flexible inflation targeting. This solution seems to be
more favorable since the official wide band would still leave enough room for flexibility in
foreign-exchange markets and thus reduce expectations of a real currency appreciation. This
approach is therefore likely to reduce the risk of speculative attacks against the currency. In any
case, a gradual closing of exchange-rate bands is advisable and this is fully consistent with the
narrowing of inflation targets proposed in our advocacy of direct inflation targeting.
The steps and procedures of approaching the ERM II have been discussed in the literature by
Bernard (1997) and Orlowski (1997c). At the beginning of the road toward joining the ERM II
and, later on, the monetary union, the candidates are likely to restructure their currency reference
baskets, increasing the euro's weight. At the same time, they will gradually phase out crawling
devaluations. At a later stage, they need unilaterally to lock their exchange rate to the euro. A
direct euro-peg with large bands is the most desirable solution at this stage. The move will be
beneficial for reducing inflation expectations and for enhancing monetary-policy credibility.
Moreover, the adjustable euro-peg would entitle the TEs to receive short-term financing upon
locking their exchange rate to the euro once they join the ERM II. There is, however, a danger of
moving TE currencies onto a unilateral peg. If one or more TEs were to experience unbalanced
fundamentals and face a risk of speculative attacks against their currency, the bilateral system
within the ERM II would cushion the better-balanced economies against possible contagion
effects, as defined by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996).
The determination of a desirable spread between domestic and foreign interest rates will be one
of the most critical issues in retooling monetary policy in preparation for the introduction of the
regime based on the exchange rate. Direct inflation targeting allows financial markets to generate
the equilibrium spread between interest rates. Interest-rate targeting would very likely distort the
alignment between the interest-rate spread and the macroeconomic fundamentals, thus causing a
deviation from the uncovered interest-parity condition.

Monetary authorities in TEs are presently inclined toward targeting interest rates. They justify
this approach because they deem it to be more effective under the current conditions of fast
growth with high demand for credit. To contain credit growth, central banks apply very high
interest rates, excessive in relation to the uncovered interest-parity condition. These high interest
rates generate incentives for strong capital inflows to investors, speculators, and even exporters.
Excessive interest rates are posing dangers for advancing further with economic transformation
because they lead to adverse selection. The problem arises when borrowers with low credit risk
do not wish to borrow, while those with the riskiest investment projects are still willing to
borrow (Mishkin, 1997). Consequently, lenders are likely to provide credit to the riskiest
allocations if interest rates are irrationally high. Higher interest rates do not necessarily reduce an
excess demand for loans due to adverse selection, as argued by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). This is
because at high interest rates lenders provide credit to the riskiest institutions. However, lenders
should not become overexposed to the riskiest loans. They are therefore likely to make high-risk
loans selectively, in the process reducing the aggregate supply of credit and aggravating the
excess demand for credit.
To substantiate the claim that excessive interest rates cause incentives for capital inflows, one
may invoke the significant advantage of money-market hedging strategies of export receivables
in Poland observed recently. For instance, assuming that a Polish exporter signed a contract to
sell DM 1 million to a German buyer at the end of November 1997, when the spot exchange rate
was ZL 2.02 per deutschmark. The exporter could immediately borrow in deutschmark at a 7
percent annual rate and repay it with receivables expected to be satisfied in March 1998. The
credit could be switched in November into zloty and invested in a four-months' deposit with a
Polish bank paying an annual rate of 21 percent. The money market hedge yields ZL 2,112,186
in March 1998. Unhedged receivables would yield only ZL 1,880,000 at the available March
spot rate of 1.88 and the forward-rate hedged contract could generate ZL 2,080,000 since the
four-months' forward selling rate of the deutschmark in November 1997 was ZL 2.08. This
example could be easily generalized to other transactions and financial manipulations elicited by
high domestic interest rates.
High interest rates in Poland promote borrowing abroad and investing in Poland not only by
investors and speculators, but by exporters as well. This results in large capital inflows as
reflected by the NBP's data on the balance of payments, which show a capital-account surplus of
$2.7 billion (1.9 percent of GDP in 1997) generated only during the first two months of 1998. In
addition, borrowing in foreign currency while swapping it into domestic currency further
contributes to an increase in demand for the domestic currency and leads to the latter's nominal
appreciation. Money-market hedging causes immediate large inflows of foreign capital. In the
above example, it brings foreign capital already in November, while both forward-hedged and
unhedged export receivables are transferred only in March. Furthermore, the money-market
hedge in relation to the forward hedge would no longer be feasible if Polish deposit rates fell to
the annual rate of approximately 16 percent. Under such conditions, incentives for large shortterm capital inflows would erode. Poland's central bank would accordingly be well advised to
lower the targeted interest rates rather than to continue the current practice of targeting excessive
rates and sterilizing corresponding capital inflows.

In sum, one of the prime tasks for TE monetary authorities is to avoid maintaining excessively
high interest rates with a view to reducing fast-growing domestic demand. TEs are therefore
well-advised to change the monetary policy into flexible inflation targeting. This will ensure a
better equilibrium between domestic and foreign interest rates, thus removing incentives for
large capital inflows.
Another problem to be addressed by the TEs is the optimal accumulation of foreign reserves at
central banks. At the present time, strong positive interest-rate differentials lead to a significant
accumulation of foreign reserves. The excessive level of reserves may be pro-inflationary, but it
is necessary to reduce the risk of speculative attacks on the domestic currency. In the future,
large foreign-exchange reserves will become less necessary since the TEs will have to transfer
some of their reserves to the ECB upon accession to the ERM II and even more upon entry into
the monetary union.
It is essential that TEs prepare for entering the monetary union by first achieving an equilibrium
exchange rate against the euro. If their currencies are overvalued in real terms, they may be
facing expectations of the currency devaluation, at the latest two years prior to the intended
accession to monetary union as per the framework set forth by the Maastricht Treaty.
IV. The last devaluation syndrome - a lesson from Greece?
Before the final preparation for accession to monetary union, actors may expect that the TEs will
enact one last devaluation. These expectations may lead to a number of effects and repercussions
that can generally be described as "the last devaluation syndrome." Financial institutions and
foreign-trade companies are likely to assume positions consistent with expectations that the
national currency will soon be devalued. Their actions may force monetary authorities to devalue
the currency. For instance, exporters are likely to lobby for the currency's devaluation,
particularly if they foresee a continuous real appreciation of the domestic currency due to
prolonged, excessive inflation. This scenario is likely to occur since the exporters' lobby is strong
throughout the TEs. Financial institutions are likely to start lowering their assets in domestic
currency and buying foreign currencies, thus causing the domestic currency to depreciate in
nominal terms. This will put additional pressures on monetary authorities to devalue the
currency.
A "return-to-peg strategy" can bring some unpleasant consequences for TEs if they are not able
to implement far-reaching institutional changes in their financial systems soon. If TE currencies
are continuously experiencing real appreciation at the final stages of preparation for entry into
the EU's monetary union, the monetary authorities will be expected to arrange for a final
devaluation. This may prove to be disastrous when debt contracts have a predominantly shortterm maturity and when substantial amounts of debt are still denominated in foreign currencies
(Mishkin, 1997). Such a devaluation may induce a deep financial crisis with financial institutions
no longer able to allocate funds to the most productive investment opportunities. Such a
devaluation may entail a needless recession. Moreover, a possible devaluation may cause a
deterioration of balance sheets of banks and firms in domestic currency terms. This may result in
a bank run. The devaluation will deteriorate the gap between short-term liabilities of banks
denominated in foreign currencies and medium- to long-term assets in domestic currencies. The

mismatch between assets and liabilities hurts the liquidity position of banks, which they may or
may not be able to overcome. If interest-rate differentials are high prior to devaluation, meaning
that domestic interest rates are considerably above foreign rates, there are strong incentives for
banks to borrow short-term in foreign currency and make longer-term maturity loans in domestic
currency. Devaluation will make it more expensive to service the short-term debt in relation to
cash flows from domestic-currency loans. In sum, an emerging market economy considering
devaluation cannot afford to have a fragile banking system and large short-term debt in foreign
currency.
A possible devaluation on the road to a currency peg may also reduce confidence in the ability of
central banks to control inflation. Certainly, devaluation will induce a lagged, one-time inflation
shock that ought to be contained with a discretionary increase in interest rates by the central
bank. Under such circumstances, flexible inflation targeting is beneficial. It allows the shock to
expire by itself.
Expectations of devaluation may be subdued if the candidates exercise a considerable degree of
exchange-rate flexibility prior to the declaration of final preparations for entry into monetary
union. This will allow for a linear depreciation of the domestic currency and for a smooth
convergence to the equilibrium exchange rate. If flexibility is restrained, for instance, by a
narrow band of permitted fluctuations or frequent interventions, foreign-exchange markets will
likely embrace expectations of a one-time devaluation, thus a nonlinear move toward exchangerate equilibrium. They will likely foresee even a one-time move to a considerably undervalued
currency (in relation to purchasing-power parity), particularly if the underlying inflation is still
high and thus contributing to expectations of a real appreciation of the currency. As argued
earlier, this may devastate the financial stability of the national economy.
Even if the macroeconomic fundamentals are met and the exchange rate is in equilibrium with
respect to the uncovered interest-parity condition or the purchasing-power parity, financial
markets may still expect a candidate for accession to the monetary union to devalue at the latest
two years prior to the intended entry. This is because of the Maastricht Treaty requirement for
that stipulates that a country's exchange rate must have been unchanged within the ERM for at
least two years. This precludes any sizable inflation within the two years preceding accession to
the monetary union. It is these expectations of a one-time devaluation approximately two years
before the intended entry to the monetary union that give rise to the "last devaluation syndrome."
Once in the ERM II, any devaluation will have to be approved by the ECB after in-depth
consultations. In extreme cases, when macroeconomic fundamentals in an ERM II country are
not met, the ECB may force the country to devalue the currency.
It is useful to avoid by all means the last devaluation's syndrome, especially if the banking
system has extensive short-term liabilities in foreign currency coupled with longer-term assets in
domestic currency. Interest payments on foreign-currency liabilities would sharply rise, causing
a liquidity problem in the banking sector and a danger of bank runs. Devaluation may induce
large capital outflows from the country. It will further hurt the credibility of monetary
authorities.

If the candidate countries opt to undergo devaluation in spite of the dangers for the financial
stability of their economies, they will have to plan it very carefully. The last devaluation should
be unannounced so that it will not induce large speculative attacks on the currency. In addition, it
would have to be supplemented by a temporary introduction of controls on capital outflows. This
solution is again consistent with the requirements of undistorted currency convertibility on
capital account stemming from OECD and EU accession agreements. But that final devaluation
can be undertaken only after consultation with the authorities of these organizations. Moreover,
the size of the last devaluation needs to be carefully assessed. It cannot be excessive for
otherwise it would cause much harm to financial stability.
It remains rather ambiguous whether the TEs will have to follow the Greek program of the final
stage of preparations for monetary union. Knowing that it will not meet the Maastricht
convergence criteria at the time of examination for entering the monetary union upon its
inception in January 1999, the Government of Greece announced in mid-March 1998 a two-year
program for acceding to the monetary union. Put briefly, the deadline for entering the system
was set for the beginning of 2001 and the Greek drachma was devalued 14 percent against the
ecu. The inflation target for 2001 was set at 2 percent. Financial markets did not fully anticipate
the last devaluation, since between the beginning of January and 15 March 1998 the drachma
traded within a 285-290 range to the dollar. It fell 12.2 percent (from 288 to 323 to the dollar)
within the two days following the devaluation. Thereafter it gradually appreciated to 315 by the
end of April. This particular experience does not prove the occurrence of the last devaluation
syndrome, and there were no major speculative attacks on the Greek currency prior to
devaluation.
However, if the TEs follow the Greek program, they may encounter some market pressures on
their currencies prior to the expected time of devaluation. Specifically, the Polish Government
has disclosed intentions to join monetary union in 2006. If the fundamentals are not fully met in
2004, currency traders in financial markets are likely to sell zloty expecting the last devaluation
to take place, regardless of its size. However, the likelihood of such a development remains to be
seen.
Conclusions
The preceding analysis of exchange-rate policies in TEs in preparation for joining the EU's
monetary union is consistent with the overall framework of monetary policy. Exchange rates are
no longer direct instruments of government policy affecting trade balances and capital inflows.
This role of the exchange rate evaporated with the dissolution of central planning and later with
the exit strategy from stabilization anchored to the exchange rate. Exchange rates are now
important market variables that provide crucial information on external balances for fiscal and
monetary authorities. More flexible exchange rates are superior for accomplishing the economic
stability and the institutional tasks of transformation. They help to augment monetary-policy
autonomy and credibility.
Gradual preparations for joining the monetary union will require a dynamic "return-to-peg
strategy" for the exchange rate. Application of a monetary policy based on the exchange rate
should be accomplished as soon as feasible. Fixing the TE currencies in terms of a stable and

strong euro will only be feasible when inflation is reduced to a low, sustainable level and when
domestic financial institutions and markets function efficiently within the new currency system.
A premature rush to the euro-peg would generate expectations of real appreciation of domestic
currencies if inflation were to remain too high. It is likely to cause asymmetric information and
liquidity problems, and possible bank runs for the reasons elaborated upon here.
This analysis has emphasized that the exchange-rate policy of the TE candidates for accession to
the EU could best be tied to a monetary policy that targets inflation in a flexible manner. The
TEs can enter the ERM II as their inflation rates fall to a low, sustainable level. Functioning
within the ERM II framework will bring a number of advantages to their stabilization efforts,
including enhancing policy credibility, expanding access to euro-zone credit markets, and
augmenting fiscal and monetary discipline.
Governments of the candidate countries will be well advised not to delay preparations of specific
plans for gradually moving toward joining the EU's monetary union and designing an optimal
"return-to-peg strategy." Such plans ought to be incorporated in overall, comprehensive
strategies of full integration within the EU. They would help accession negotiators for both the
EU and the candidates by ensuring consistency of specific tasks for the TEs in effectively
preparing themselves for full EU integration.
Notes
(1.) The amount borrowed immediately is DM 1,000,000 x 1/1.0233 or DM 977,230.53. It is
swapped into ZL 1974,005.67 (that is, 977,230.53 x 2.02) and then invested at a Polish bank for
four months at 7 percent, yielding ZL 2, 112,186.07 (that is, 1974,005.97 x 1.07).
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